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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Appellant#

:

v.

:

Case No. 970275-CA

JAMES REDD and JEANNE REDD,

:

Priority No. 2

Defendants/Appellees•

:

BRIEF OF APPELLEES

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
The defendants were charged in the Seventh Judicial District
in and for San Juan County, with one count of abuse of a dead human
body,

in

violation

of

Utah

Code

76-9-704

and

one

count

of

misdemeanor trespass on trust land. A preliminary hearing was held
on March 20, 1997.

The Trial Court, having heard the testimony,

argument, and considered
felony.

the motion, refused

to bind over the

The Court issued a written order dated April 1, 1997, from

which the State appeals.

Jurisdiction is proper under Utah Code

Ann. 77-18a-l(2) (a) 1985 and 78-2a-3 (2) (e) 1996.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE ON APPEAL AND
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW
The primary legal issue in this appeal is whether the Trial
Court committed reversible error in its written Findings and Order,
included in the State's Brief as Addendum B, when the Court found
that the statute prohibiting certain conduct involving a "dead
1

human body" did not apply to "remains," in this case, small pieces
of scattered, unidentified bone fragments•

This portion of the

ruling is a statute interpretation, a question of law, which is
reviewed for correctness.

State v. Larsen, 865 P.2d 1355, 1357

(Utah 1993) .
Because the State argues reversible error in the failure to
bind over for trial, an ancillary issue is the standard of review
of the Trial Court's factual findings.

Rule 52 of the Utah Rules

of Civil Procedure provides, in pertinent part, that "Findings of
fact, whether based on oral or documentary evidence, shall not be
set aside unless clearly erroneous and due regard shall be given
to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of
the witness."

Rule 26(7) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure

and case law, State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 192 (Utah, 1987), make
U.R.C.P. 52 apply to criminal cases. Thus clearly erroneous in the
standard for review of the written Court Order findings of fact.
Ancillary,

also, is the effect

Court, prior to its written ruling.

of oral statements by the
Contrary to the attempts of

the State to use comments by the Court outside the written order,
"oral statements of opinion by the Trial Court, inconsistent with
the findings

do not

affect

the

final

judgment."

Clothier, 121 Utah 311, 241 P.2d 468, 472 (1952).

McCollum

v.

"Oral statements

and observations of the Trial Court in discussing the evidence do
not bind him, nor do they limit his prerogative of finally making
up his mind and such statements and observations are superseded by
the final written findings and judgment."
2

Newton v. State Road

Comm.,

23 Utah

2d

350, 353, 463

P.2d

565, 566

(1970).

All

"incidents, impressions, or statements made by the Court prior to
that judgment are precluded."

State v. Gerrard, 584 P.2d 885, 886

(Utah 1978).
Thus, for purposes of appeal, the Trial Court's written Order
stands, only to be tested by a clearly erroneous standard.

For

purposes of appeal, there is only a finding that the State did not
show "that the bones were in their original place of repose before
they were disturbed by defendants" (Findings and Order, Addendum
B, Appellants Brief).

This finding of no disinterment is firmly

planted on the credibility of State witness, Officer Naranjo, who
testified that the bone material, found the day after the meeting
with defendants, "was spread around."

(R.80).

Officer Naranjo

agreed that the "spread around" description is "the same kind of
spread around as the thing that you see throughout San Juan County,
that when you see areas, you see bone fragments occasionally."
(R.80)
Thus,

there

is

no

review,

no

review

standard,

and

no

permissible inclusions in the appeal, for oral Court statements
made prior to written Findings and Orders.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
The statute interpreted is Utah Code Ann. 76-9-704

(1995).

It is provided in its entirety in the State's Addendum A to its
opening brief; however, the words in question are found in 76-9704(1)(a) and (b).
A person is guilty of abuse or desecration of
3

a dead human body if the person intentionally
and unlawfully:
(a)

removes,
finding

conceals,

fails to report the

of a dead body

enforcement agency,

to a

local law

or destroys

a dead

body or any part of it;
(b)

disinters a buried or otherwise interred
dead body, without authority

of a Court

order•
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The Appellees

concur with

the Appellant's

statement

of

the

case.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
The
facts;

appellees

however,

the

concur,

generally,

following,

with

omitted

by

the
the

State's
State,

quoted
must

be

included.
Officer Naranjo, the State's first witness, testified that the
bone material in question was not discovered until the day after
the meeting of defendants and law enforcement.
to Officer Naranjo,

the bone material

(R.80).

According

"was spread around."

The

"spread around" description is "the same kind of spread around as
the thing that you see throughout San Juan County, that when you
see areas, you see bone fragments occasionally."

(R.80).

Further, Mr. Davidson, who is quoted in the State's Statement
of Facts as having "found 13-15 boxes, 'generally within very close
proximity'...."

(State's Brief, page 5 ) , also testified that "we

4

found them at several different locations...." (R.103).

Further,

he agreed that he "picked up several things that you think may or
may not be human, you have some bones that you're sure about/ some
that you're not so sure about." (R.103).

The three locations he

found them were "seven or eight feet from one location to the
other" (R.104) and the bone fragments were "sort of disposed of in
kind of a random matter--manner/ I'd say." (R.104).
The Court made oral statements and then, on April 1# 1997 #
issued written Findings and Order (Addendum B to State's Brief).
The

written

Order

did

not

find

probable

cause

to

believe

disinterment/ rather the written Order was specific in stating "The
state has not shown that the bones were in their original place of
repose before they were disturbed by defendants" (emphasis added)
(Findings and Order, Addendum B of State's Brief/ paragraph 2 ) .
The

State's

inclusion

of

the

Court's

oral

statements

in

its

Statement of Issue on Appeal/ in its Summary of Argument, in its
Argument/ Point One, immediately prior to its conclusion, and in
its Statement of Facts, is of no consequence to this appeal because
all "incidents, impressions, or statements made by the Court prior
to that judgment are precluded."

State v. Gerrard, 584 P.2d 885,

886 (Utah, 1978) . Further "oral statements of opinion by the trial
court

inconsistent

judgment."
(1952).

with

the

findings

do not

affect

the

final

McCollum v. Clothier, 121 Utah 311,241 P.2d 468, 472

"Oral statements and observations of the trial court in

discussing the evidence do not bind him, nor do they limit his
prerogative of finally making up his mind and such statements and
5

observations are superseded by the formal written findings and
judgment."

Newton v. State Road Comm.f 23 Utah 2d 350/ 353, 463

P.2d 565, 566 (1970)•
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The primary legal issue in this appeal is whether the Trial
Court committed error in its written Findings and Order, included
in the State's Brief as Addendum B, when it found that the felony
charge prohibiting certain conduct involving a "dead human body"
did

not

apply

to

"remains,"

in

this

case,

small

pieces

of

unidentified bone.
There is a paucity of Utah law defining "dead body" and none
interpreting "dead human body" as that term is used in Utah Code
Ann.

76-9-704 (1) (a) .

define

this

term.

The statute itself does not, internally,
However,

the

annotation

and

collateral

references appearing within the statute refer us to Corpus Juris
Secundum 25A, C.J.S. Dead Bodies, Section 10.

25A C.J.S. Dead

Bodies, Section 1, at p. 488, specifically defines dead body as:
the body of a human being deprived of life, it
signifies a corporeal or tangible entity,

and

does not include remains long since decomposed
(emphasis added).
C.J.S. then footnotes three long standing cases in support of
the exclusion of long decomposed remains from the definition of
dead bodies.

Those cases are Meade v. Dougherty County, 25 S.E.

915, 98 Ga. 697, 700 (Ga. 1896), Carter v. Zanesville, 52 N.E. 126,
59 Ohio St., 170, 174 (Ohio 1898), and State v. Glass, 273 N.E. Id
6

893, 896, 27 Ohio App. 2d 214 (Ohio Ct. App. 1971) 52 ALR 3d, 691.
The State's Brief, containing reference to twenty-three cases,
is void of even one case that defines "dead bodies" to include
"remains," in this case, a collection of small bones that form no
identifiable entity; nor is there even a suggestion in the State's
argument or in the facts that the bone fragments all came from the
same source.
The State argues, outside the record, that the Trial Court's
failure

to

include

disparate

bone

remains

under

definition for "dead human body," is a racist act.

the

felony

In addition to

the shocking nature of this outside-the-record red herring, the
untenable nature of the State's position is also so obvious as to
be without
contrary,

any

case,

rule, or

the Tenth Circuit

statutory

Court

support.

of Appeals,

To

the

in a 1997 case

arising out of Utah, U.S. v. Shumway, 112 F.3rd 1413, when faced
with whether

an

Anasazi

infant

victim"

for

initially
of

great

purposes

relatively

antiquity

of

sentence

complete

qualified

skeleton

as

enhancement,

a

of an

"vulnerable

addressed

the

extrapolation from bones to remains.

The Tenth Circuit Court of

Appeals,

p.

Judge

Brorby,

writing,

at

1423,

illustrates

the

absurdity of such an application, extrapolation and interpretation,
by considering "a pile of cremated remains, or a pile of dirt that
was once a pile of bones, if skeletal remains are
victims,' certainly,
qualify."

then,

these

'vulnerable

types of remains also

should

To paraphrase the Circuit applying facts of the instant

case, if disparate small bones rise to the level of "dead human
7

body," then so must those same bones, cremated, or reduced to a
pile of dirt.

The lack of logic of such an interpretation is

patent.
The Tenth Circuit Judge hastens to say, as does everyone, that
the Court "in no way intend to diminish the cultural importance of
those sites nor the importance of a commitment to the preservation
of those sites."

Shumwav, supra, p. 1423, footnote 4.

"Grave

robbing, especially grave robbery of the sacred objects of Native
Americans,

is undoubtedly

detestable

conduct

worthy

of

severe

castigation; however, such castigation cannot come at the expense
of reason and common sense."

Shumwav, supra, p. 1423, footnote 4.

It is that reason and common sense that the Trial Court in the
instant case exercised in its written Findings and Order, when it
found that the State's position "would extend Section 76-9-704 to
all private lands in Utah, contrary to legislative intent, and make
it a felony for private persons to disturb one-thousand year-old
remains on their own lands."

(Written Order, paragraph 8, Addendum

B of Appellant's Brief).
The Statefs position, unsupported by authority or reason and
common

sense, would make criminals out of the bean farmer who

unearths bone fragments and fails to report them to the local law
enforcement, the family on a picnic, the casual hiker, or a citizen
strolling home from church who sees bone fragments and fails to
report the finding to local law enforcement, because there is a
misdemeanor aspect to this very same statute, which the Trial Court
found inapplicable to bone fragments.
8

U.C.A. 76-9-704(1) (a) makes

it a crime, a misdemeanor, if one "intentionally and unlawfully
fails

to

report

the

finding

of

a dead

body

to

a

local

law

enforcement agency, or destroys a dead body or any part of it."
To adopt the State's reasoning that the stage of decomposition has
no bearing on this matter is to walk into the absurd position
highlighted by the Tenth Circuit - if a skeleton qualifies, then
so must a pile of bones, a pile of bones cremated, and a pile of
dirt that was once a pile of bones.
The State is also inaccurate in its position that the statute
is ambiguous in its meaning, opening the door to seeking guidance
from the legislative history and relevant policy consideration.
When statutory language is clear and unambiguous, it must be held
to mean what it expresses, and no room is left for construction.
Kearns-Tribune Corporation v. Hornak, 917 P.2d 79, 82 (Utah App.
1996) .
The State seeks to include bone fragments in the definition
of dead human body.

To demonstrate the lack of logic of this

approach, as well as the clear and unambiguous meaning of "dead
human body, " one only has to reread the statute and substitute
"bone fragments" for the words "dead body."

The following are

highlights of the statute read as urged by the State:
1.

A person is guilty of abuse or desecration of
a dead human body if the person intentionally
and unlawfully:
a)

removes,
the

conceals,

finding

of
9

fails

to report

bone fragments

to a

local

law

enforcement

destroys bone fragments

agency
or

any

or
part

of it;
b)

disinters

a

buried

interred

bone

or

otherwise

fragment,

without

authority of a Court order;
c)

dismembers
extent,

a

or

bone

damages

fragment
or

to

any

detaches any

port or portion of a bone fragment; or
d)

commits/
any
or

or

attempts to commit

bone fragment
intercourse,

upon

sexual penetration
object rape, sodomy,

or object sodomy ...
The plain language of this statute shows the legislative
intent - it is to protect, under the common usage, a dead human
body.
Contrary to the position and argument of the State, the order
subject to appeal, which, by law, supersedes any bench comments or
findings,

and which

controls

the appeal, shows no

probable cause of disinterred human remains.
this point.

finding of

Utah law is clear on

Statements made by a trial judge are not the judgment

of the case and it is only the signed judgment that prevails.
State v. Gerrard, 584 P.2d 885, 886 (Utah 1978).

"Oral statements

and observations of the trial court in discussing the evidence do
not bind him, nor do they limit his prerogative of finally making
up his mind and such statements and observations are superseded by
10

the formal written findings of judgment."
Comm.,

23 Utah 2d 350, 353, 463 P.2d

Newton v. State Road

565, 566

(1970).

"Oral

statements of opinion by the trial court inconsistent with the
findings do not affect the final judgment."
121 Utah 311, 241 P.2d 468, 472 (1952).

McCollum v. Clothier,

The order is clear - in

paragraph 2 - "the state has not shown that the bones were in their
original place of repose before they were disturbed by defendants."
(Findings and Order, p. 1, paragraph 2, Addendum B of Appellant's
Brief, emphasis

added.)

Despite

this clear ruling,

the State

argues, incorrectly, in its Statement of Issue on Appeal, in its
Summary of Argument, in its Argument, Point One, and immediately
prior to its conclusion, that the Court found probable cause to
bel ieve

the

defendants

disinterred

human

remains.

Utah

law

prohibits such reliance.
Thus, the State's argument is void of legal support, is based
upon impermissible reliance upon oral statements by the Court,
superseded by written order,
contradicts

is illogical

in its application,

the logic of the Tenth Circuit, defies reason and

common sense, and, in its inflammatory position, is outside the
record.

The Trial Court is well grounded, reasoned, and proper in

its ruling.

The Trial Court, contrary to the ill-founded State

attempt to label, was not racist in its ruling.
The Trial Court committed no reversible error in its Findings
and Order.

11

ARGUMENT
Point One
THE TERM

"DEAD HUMAN BODY,"

AS USED IN

SECTION 76-9-704,

DOES NOT INCLUDE A RANDOM COLLECTION OF SMALL BONE FRAGMENTS,
Utah Code Annotated 76-9-704(1) makes it a crime to fail to
report to local law enforcement the finding of a dead human body.
That crime is a misdemeanor.
to disinter,

destroy,

assault a dead body.

The same statute makes it a felony

dismember,

damage,

detach,

or

sexually

The trial court found that a prehistoric

random collection of small bones and bone fragments did not rise
to the level of the definition of dead human body, as used in this
statute.
The

Court

interprets

a

statutory

term

"according

to its

usually accepted meaning, where the ordinary meaning of the term
results in an application that is neither unreasonably confused,
inoperable, nor in blatant contradiction of the express purpose of
the statute."

B. L. Key, Inc. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n., 934 P. 2d

1164 (Utah App. 1997), citing Morton Int'l, Inc. v. Auditing Div.
of Utah State Tax Comm'n., 814 P.2d 581, 590 (Utah 1991).
One must "look first to the plain language of the statute to
discern the legislative intent ....

Only when we find ambiguity

in the statute's plain language need we seek guidance from the
legislative history and relevant policy considerations."

City of

South Salt Lake v. Salt Lake County, 925 P.2d 954 (Utah 1996),
quoting Gohler v. Wood, 919 P.2d 561, 562-63

(Utah 1996), which

quoted World Peace Movement of Amer., v Newspaper Agency Corp., 879
12

P.2d 253, 259 (Utah 1994).
The Courts "have nothing to do with what the law ought to be."
Hanchett v. Burbridcre, 59 Utah 127, 135, 202 P. 377, 380 (1921).
The Courts "must be guided by the law as it is .... when language
is

clear

and

unambiguous,

it

must

be

held

to mean

expresses, and no room is left for construction."

what

it

Kearns-Tribune

Corporation v. Hornak, 917 P.2d 79, 82 (Utah App. 1996), quoting
Salt Lake Child & Family Therapy Clinic, Inc. v. Frederick, 890
P.2d 1017, 1020 (Utah 1979).
"Unambiguous language in the statute may not be interpreted
to contradict its plain meaning."

Salt Lake Child & Family Therapy

Clinic, Inc. v. Frederick, 890-P.2d 1017, 1020 (Utah 1997), quoting
Bonham v. Morgan, 788 P.2d 497, 500 (Utah 1989) (per curiam).
When reviewing a statute, we "assume { } that each term in the
statute was used advisedly;
literally,

unless

inoperable."

such

thus the statutory words are read

a reading

is unreasonably

confused

or

Salt Lake Therapy Clinic v. Frederick, supra, quoting

Savage Indus., Inc. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 811 P.2d 664, 690
(Utah 1991) .
There is no Utah case defining "dead human body" for purposes
of Utah Code Ann. 76-9-704.

The appellees urge there need not be,

for it has a common meaning.

The statute, internally, does not so

define

that collection of words.

However,

the annotation and

collateral references of this statute refers us to Corpus Juris
Secundum 25A C.J.S. Dead Bodies, Section 10.

25A C.J.S. Dead

Bodies, Section 1, at p. 488, specifically defines dead body as
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"the body

of

a human being

deprived

of

life;

it

signifies a

corporeal or tangible entity, and does not include remains long
since decomposed,"
ancient

cases

in

(emphasis added).
support

of

the

C.J.S. then footnotes two

lack

of

inclusion

of

long

decomposed remains, Meade v. Dougherty County, 25 S.E. 915, 98 Ga.
697, 700 (Ga. 1896) and Carter v. Zanesville, 52 N.E. 126, 59 Ohio
St., 170, 174

(Ohio 1898) and one a bit more modern, State v.

Glass, 273 N.E. 2d 893, 896, 27 Ohio App. 2d 214 (Ohio Ct. App.
1971) 52 A.L..R. 3d 691.
The State cites no case in this century, or the last, in this
state or other, that defines "dead body" to include long decomposed
remains or bone fragments.
A statutory historical search supports the clear unambiguous
meaning of "dead human body" in this statute to refer to body, not
bone fragments.

The predecessor of 76-9-704 is the 1953 76-10-1

"Disinterring dead bodys".
704 "Abuse of a corpse".

By 1978, 76-10-1 evolved into 76-9-

The 1988 amendment evolved the title into

"Abuse or desecration of a dead human body".
The consistent key is the concept of body, of corpse
recognizable entity.

- a

Webster's Ninth New International Dictionary

and Stedman's Medical Dictionary, 24th edition, approach "body"
from a common sense, every day meaning.

The primary definition of

body in Webster is, "The organized physical existence or an animal
or plant either living or dead: as 1)

the material part or nature

of a human being..." and Stedman1s defines "body" as "the total
organized physical substance of an animal or plant."
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Rule 4 (h) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure provides
that the charging

"words and phrases used are to be construed

according to the usual meaning unless they are otherwise defined
by law or have acquired a legal meaning."

Nowhere in the State's

brief is there any cited authority that "dead body # " as it relates
to this statute#

has acquired a different legal meaning or is

defined by law.

Rather, the State's entire approach and cases

support the common meaning of body - an entity, as does a simple
reading of this statute.
Contrary to the State's position, the term "dead human body,"
as used in Section 76-9-704, does not and cannot extend to include
a random collection of small bone fragments.
Point Two
UTAH CODE 76-9-704 IS INTERNALLY CONSISTENT IN ITS PREMISE
THAT

"DEAD BODY"

RELATES

TO

AN ENTITY

OTHER THAN LONG DECOMPOSED REMAINS,
This statute in question prohibits a number of activities, all
relating to a body, not bone fragments.

76-9-704(1) (c) relates to

dismembering and 1(d) relates to sexual assault on a dead body.
The mere substitution of the State's position - body equals bone
fragments - shows the inconsistency of their position and internal
consistency of the statute. Does it make sense to sexually assault
bone fragments?

Does it make sense to criminalize the seeing and

not reporting to local authorities, the sighting of bone fragments?
The

exemptions

contained

within

the

statute

show

consistency that body is the common meaning of "body."
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internal

The statute

exempts from liability the actions relating to funeral parlors (who
deal in bodies, not bone fragments), anatomical gifts (bodies, not
bone fragments), the medical examiner (bodies, not bone fragments),
giving abandoned bodies, not bone fragments, to medical schools,
and the use of bodies, not bone fragments, for research.
Seized upon by the State is the fact that 76-9-704 exempts
from application, the lawful actions of anyone under U.C.A. 9-8301 et. seq. - Antiquities.

This Act relates to the preservation

and protection of the State's archaeological and anthropological
resources, largely on school and institutional
lands.

trust and grant

Nowhere, as the State admits, does the Antiquities Act

define "dead body."

Rather, the State reasons,

syllogistically,

that since the Antiquities Act does not apply to "dead human body"
but

rather

to

anthropological

a host

of

things,

remains,

there

including

was

an

archaeological

unnecessary

or

exclusion,

rendering "the state's Antiquities Act exception mere surplusage."
The State attempts to improperly leverage the Antiquities Act, with
which

the

argument.

defendants

are

not

charged,

into

assisting

their

The simple fact is the coverage of the Antiquities Act

is wider than the far more limited "dead human body," contained in
the

specific

statute

at

issue.

The

exclusion

includes

proceeding under the Act as it may relate to bodies.

those

This is

logical and not a twist that invalidates the common sense, well
supported concept of the "dead body."
The State then flows into an examination of U.C.A. 9-9-401 et.
seq., the Native American Grave Protection and Repatriation Act,
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again, with which the defendants are not charged.

This Act deals

specifically with the ownership or control of Native American
remains from State lands and there is no case law or statute cited
by the State, nor in existence# which supports the argument that
the

remains

in

the

Native

American

Grave

Protection

and

Repatriation Act relate to the definition of dead body in 76-9704.

Again, "remains" is an illogical substitution in 76-9-704.
This statute is internally consistent in its premise that

"dead body"

relates

to an

entity

other

than

long

decomposed

remains.
Point Three
THE TRIAL COURT'S INTERPRETATION OF DEAD HUMAN BODY IS NEITHER
RACIST NOR UNWORKABLE, AND VIOLATES NO PUBLIC POLICY,
The State cites World Peace Movement v. Newspaper Agency
Corp. , 879 P.2d 253, 259
"relevant

policy

interpretation.

(Utah 1994), for the proposition that

considerations"

also

help

guide

statutory-

Germanely, this case holds that when faced with

a question of statutory construction, we look first to the plain
language of the statute.

Only when we find ambiguity

in the

statute's plain language need we seek guidance from the legislative
history and relevant policy consideration.
id.

World Peace Movement,

Unlike World Peace Movement, id., the State fails to search

out the legislative history, involving floor debates and the like
in the instant case.

Unlike World Peace Movement, id., and its

concerned Act, U.C.A. 13-7-1, which sets forth the public policy
of this state involving that Act, the State, in the instant case,
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cites no reported public policy.

Rather, the State tries to incite

the Court by unfairly and with no foundation, playing the "racism"
card.

Utah Code Ann. 76-9-704 is color and race blind, as is the

opinion of the Trial Court.

This issue, introduced for the first

time on appeal, is a red herring, designed to lure the emotional
and unknowledgeable from the path of very clear legal analysis and
conclusion.
There is no hint that the bone fragments in the instant case
were ever buried.

Speculations, which are the meat of this State

maneuver, can equally include death alone, animal scattering, a
battle with unburied dead, multiple individuals, and more.

The

State forgets that the written, controlling, factual finding by
the Trial Court is no evidence of removal from original place of
repose was presented by the State.
Tellingly, the State cites no authority, of any sort, for this
unsupported, outside-the-record attempt to inflame.
In closing this argument, the State, again, forgets Utah law
and the Court written findings, when the State asserts "... it was
their intentional and unlawful disinterring of the dead."

This

differs dramatically from the Court's Findings and Order, that "the
state has not shown that the bones were in their original place of
repose before they were disturbed by defendants."

(Addendum B of

Appellant's Brief, page 1, paragraph 2, emphasis added.)
Rule 52 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedures provides, in
pertinent part, that "Findings of fact, whether based on oral or
documentary

evidence,

shall

not
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be

set

aside

unless

clearly

erroneous and due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the
trial court to judge the credibility of the witness."

Rule 26(7)

of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure and case law, State v.
Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 192 (Utah, 1987), make U.R.C.P. 52 apply to
criminal cases. As is set forth in the Statement of Facts, Officer
Naranjo testified that the positions of the bone fragments, when
found, were "spread around" (R.80), and agreed that "spread around"
as he used it, was "the same kind of spread around as the thing
that you see throughout San Juan County, that when you see areas,
you see bone fragments occasionally."

(R.80).

Mr. Davidson, also

a State witness, found their placement to be "sort of disposed of
in kind of a random matter--manner, I'd say."

(R.104).

The oral statements, relied upon incorrectly by the State,
are, at best, "opinion by the trial court inconsistent with the
(and) findings do not affect the final judgment."
Clothier, 121 Utah 311, 241 P.2d 468, 472 (1952).

McCollum v.

"Oral statements

and observations of the trial court in discussing the evidence do
not bind him, nor do they limit his prerogative of finally making
up his mind and such statements and observations are superseded by
the formal written findings and judgment."
Comm.,

23 Utah

2d

350, 353, 463

P.2d

Newton v. State Road

565,

566

(1970).

All

"incidents, impressions, or statements made by the Court prior to
that judgment are precluded."

State v. Gerrard, 584 P.2d 885, 886

(Utah 1978).
In summary, the State cites no clearly defined public policy,
contrary

to its cited authority which contains
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the applicable

public policy within the statute.

More importantly, this statute,

76-9-704, is both color and race blind, as is the Court's Findings
and Order.

These orders, again, found at Addendum B of the State's

Brief, control the appeal and the oral statements relied upon the
State are superseded by the written order.

The State's ill-played

race card is outside the record, and has no foundation in law or
fact.

The Order violates no public policy.

The State's argument

is specious and can only act to unfairly denigrate an excellent
jurist and erode the position of the Trial Court in the eyes of the
uninformed public.
Point Four
SECTION 76-9-704 IS NOT APPLICABLE TO THE INSTANT FACTS
AND THE TRIAL COURT WAS CORRECT IN ITS RULING,
The State's final argument

is a factual argument, heaping

conjecture upon innuendo, "fair implication" upon "fair inference,"
followed by a mis-reliance upon the oral statements of the Court,
prior to its written order.
As previously pointed out in the preceding section, Utah law
is that:
a)

the Trial Court's findings,

absent abuse

and clear error, stand;
b)

all impressions or statements made by the
Court prior to the judgment are precluded.
State v. Gerrard, 584
P.2d 885 (Utah 1978)

The Findings and Order are clear and, contrary to the State's
repeated error, there was no written finding of probable cause that
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the defendants disinterred human remains•

The Court's findings,

supported by the record, are that the State did not show that the
bones were in their original place of repose before they were
disturbed by defendants.
The primary legal issue in the appeal is whether the Trial
Court committed error in its written Findings and Order, when it
found that the felony charge prohibiting certain conduct involving
a "dead human body" did not apply to bone fragments.
Viewing the facts in the best light for the State, these
remains are simply bone fragments, unidentified and unidentifiable
as a dead human body.

The written factual finding is disturbed,

not disinterred, and disturbed does not violate the statute.

More

importantly, as has been exhaustively argued, supported by law,
statutory interpretation cannot be used to rewrite the law, to
create a meaning that does not exist, to sacrifice reason and
common sense on the altar of emotion.
Section 76-9-704 is not applicable

to random unidentified

disinterred bone fragments.
This Trial Court, with the same wisdom of the Tenth Circuit
Court of Appeals, refused to torture, twist, or turn a common
meaning

into

an

illogical

result.

It

simply

rejected

an

interpretation of a criminal statute that would criminalize the
conduct

of a large number

of

the citizens of Utah.

Who, in

exploring to any depth, the phenomenal natural wonders of Utah,
has not seen pottery
reported

shards and bone

those sightings

fragments

- and who has

to local law enforcement?
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Can every

farmer, who works to feed us, be a criminal when he fails to report
the finding of bone fragments?

Is a judge who simply follows the

law and sees the illogical result of an illogical State position,
properly branded a racist?
It is a sad state of affairs when the State can present not
one

case

that

supports

their

position

as

to

their

desired

definition of "dead human body," yet argue for thirty-one pages
that bone fragments, decomposed, unidentifiable remains, are the
same as a "dead body," that contrary to the written findings, there
was probable cause as to disinterment, that a simple act of common
sense was

racist,

all

the while

ignoring

the

fact

position criminalizes thousands of innocent citizens.

that

their

The State

builds their foundation on sand.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated, the Trial Court's written Findings and
Order must not be found to be an abuse of discretion or clear
error.

The

written

order

stands.

There

is

no

substitution of "bone fragments" for "dead body."

reasonable

The statute,

Findings and Order, and rationale of the Trial Court, are all color
and race blind.

It is a matter of law and common sense.
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